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WELCOME TO THE MACHINE: PRIVACY AND WORKPLACE 
IMPLICATIONS OF PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS 
 
Robert Sprague
* 
 
Cite as: Robert Sprague, Welcome to the Machine: Privacy and Workplace 
Implications of Predictive Analytics, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12 (2015), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i4/article12.pdf. 
 
Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in 
the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over 
information about ourselves.
1
 
 
[T]he volume of information that people create 
themselves—the full range of communications from voice 
calls, e-mails and texts to uploaded pictures, video, and 
music—pales in comparison to the amount of digital 
information created about them each day.
2
 
 
 
 
                                               
*
 J.D., M.B.A. Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, University of Wyoming 
College of Business, Department of Management & Marketing.  A working draft of this 
article was presented at the Legal and Ethical Dimensions in Predictive Data Analytics 
Colloquium sponsored by Virginia Tech University and the Center for Business 
Information Analytics at the Pamplin College of Business, June 20, 2014.  The author 
thanks Kellsie Jo Nienhuser, J.D. 2015 University of Wyoming College of Law, for her 
excellent research assistance. 
 
1 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968). 
 
2 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 2 (2014) [hereinafter BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_201
4.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9PNW-JBEK (emphasis in original). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Predictive analytics use a method known as data mining to identify 
trends, patterns, or relationships among data, which can then be used to 
develop a predictive model;
3
 in many cases attempting to predict behavior.  
The advent of ubiquitous monitoring and tracking—from self-generated 
content, web browsing, online transactions, geolocation tracking, and 
infrastructure sensors—provide the “big data” needed for data mining and 
predictive analytics.  Privacy law has not kept up, particularly since most 
of the data are “public”, in that they are not secret or confidential.  Yet, big 
data mining can reveal intimate facts and portrayals of individuals. 
 
[2] After providing general background on data analytics, this article 
explores possible theories of privacy protection for predictive analytics; 
specifically under the evolving “mosaic” theory that has so far been 
considered, to varying degrees, in Fourth Amendment search scenarios.  
This article makes an argument that predictive analytics are ripe for 
privacy protection based on the mosaic theory. 
 
[3] This article then turns to predictive analytics in the workplace, 
exploring ways in which big data is used in the employment context and 
considering what level of privacy protection may be available to workers.  
The conclusion is not optimistic, from a privacy advocacy perspective, as 
workplace privacy was already minimized before big data even made its 
appearance.  For all practical purposes, it is impossible to avoid “emitting” 
digital information that can be collected, stored, analyzed, and used for a 
myriad of decision scenarios; all one can really do is be aware that it is 
                                               
3 See CHARLES NYCE, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS WHITE PAPER 1 (2007), available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140305101843/http://www.theinstitutes.org/doc/predictive
modelingwhitepaper.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XR7P-DYPP; see also HERMAN T. 
TAVANI, ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY: CONTROVERSIES, QUESTIONS, AND STRATEGIES FOR 
ETHICAL COMPUTING 150 (4th ed. 2013) (describing data mining as involving “the 
indirect gathering of personal information through an analysis of implicit patterns 
discoverable in data[;]” noting further that “[d]ata mining activities can generate new and 
sometimes non-obvious classifications or categories”). 
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occurring—just about everywhere, just about all the time. 
 
II.  PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS 
 
[4] Predictive analytics enable organizations to determine trends and 
relationships that may not have otherwise been readily apparent.
4
  
Increasingly sophisticated statistical models coupled with the growth of 
“big data” 5  have led to an increasing use of predictive analytics in a 
variety of situations.
6
  The range of predictive analytics is bolstered by the 
                                               
4 See NYCE, supra note 3, at 1; see also CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, HUNTON & 
WILLIAMS LLP, BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS: SEEKING FOUNDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE 
PRIVACY GUIDANCE 1 (2013) [hereinafter BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS], available at 
http://www.hunton.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News_files/Big_Data_and_Analytics_
February_2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NAN3-79N6 (“While traditionally 
analytics has been used to find answers to predetermined questions, its application to big 
data enables exploration of information to see what knowledge may be derived from it, 
and to identify connections and relationships that are unexpected or were previously 
unknowable.”). 
 
5 See BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS, supra note 4, at 1 (describing big data as “vast stores of 
information gathered from traditional sources (e.g., public record data, health data, 
financial and transactional data) and from new collection points . . . (e.g., web data, 
sensor data, text data, time and location data and data gleaned from social networks)”).  
“Big data is characterized by the variety of its sources, the speed at which it is collected 
and stored, and its sheer volume.”  Id.  See also Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of 
Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 74, 74 (2013) (referring to big 
data as “novel ways in which organizations, including government and businesses, 
combine diverse digital datasets and then use statistics and other data mining techniques 
to extract from them both hidden information and surprising correlations”).  Viktor 
Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, while noting there is no “rigorous” definition of 
big data, refer to it as “things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller 
one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways that change markets, 
organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments, and more.”  VIKTOR 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6 (2013). 
 
6 See, e.g., NYCE, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing the increasing use of analytics in 
insurance underwriting); see also BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS, supra note 4, at 1 (noting 
that analytics can “help identify individuals in need of social services, detect fraud, 
predict the effects of natural disasters, recognize patterns in scientific research and 
discover trends in consumer demand”); Steve Lohr, Banking Start-Ups Adopt New Tools 
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vast amount of increasingly available data: online transaction records, e-
mail messages and metadata,
7
 images, web browsing logs, search queries, 
health records, social networking interactions, geolocation tracking, and 
sensors deployed in infrastructure such as communications networks, 
electric grids, global positioning satellites, roads and bridges, as well as in 
homes, clothing, and mobile phones.
8
  One can think of predictive 
analytics another way: “instead of people using search engines to better 
understand information, search engines will use big data to better 
understand people.”9 
                                               
for Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/technology/banking-start-ups-adopt-new-tools-for-
lending.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L4JK-6HWE (noting that with the use of 
predictive analytics, loan underwriting could depend on whether customers use only 
capital letters when filling out forms).  
 
7 Metadata are essentially data about data.  See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON 
SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A 
TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE xi (2014) [hereinafter BIG DATA AND PRIVACY], available 
at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_an
d_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L3CU-RCD8 (“Metadata are 
ancillary data that describe properties of the data such as the time the data were created, 
the device on which they were created, or the destination of a message.”). 
 
8 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 83–97; Omer Tene & Jules 
Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013); see also Ariana Eunjung Cha, ‘Smart Pills’ 
with Chips, Cameras and Robotic Parts Raise Legal, Ethical Questions, WASH. POST 
(May 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/smart-pills-
with-chips-cameras-and-robotic-parts-raise-legal-ethical-questions/2014/05/24/6f6d715e-
dabb-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WD2Y-6VS9 
(describing how “companies and academic research teams are rushing to make ingestible 
or implantable chips that will help patients track the condition of their bodies in real time 
and in a level of detail that they have never seen before”). 
 
9 Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data 
Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 65–66 (2013), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/66_StanLRevOnline_6
5_KerrEarle.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CE3G-SM2Q. 
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[5] But predictive analytics can go a step further than traditional data 
analysis—creating a picture of social behavior that was not previously 
possible.
10
  Ericka Menchen-Trevino notes that a new interdisciplinary 
field, computational social science, is forming around the social analysis 
of digital imprints left by e-mail, text messages, tweets, surfing the web, 
social media applications, and smart phones.
11
  These data are not 
necessarily tracking transactional records of atomized behavior—such as 
the purchasing history of customers—but are keeping track of 
communication dynamics and social interactions.
12
  For computational 
social scientists, big data is “big” not because of its size, but because its 
analytical potential is qualitatively different.
13
  Indeed, some researchers 
claim that big data can track human behavior more precisely than 
theoretical models.
14
  Big data can help illuminate the complexity that 
                                               
10 See Ericka Menchen-Trevino, Collecting Vertical Trace Data: Big Possibilities and 
Big Challenges for Multi-Method Research, 5 POL’Y & INTERNET 328, 328 (2013); see 
also BEN WABER, PEOPLE ANALYTICS 10–12 (2013) (discussing a “Sociometer” that 
incorporates “the critical sensors necessary to understand many aspects of human 
behavior”); Emily Singer, Is “Self-Tracking” the Secret to Living Better?, MIT TECH. 
REV. (June 9, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/424252/is-self-tracking-
the-secret-to-living-better/, archived at http://perma.cc/3NMD-AXLK (reporting on the 
self-tracking movement which utilizes wireless sensing devices and smartphones to track 
personal lifestyle data). 
 
11 See Menchen-Trevino, supra note 10, at 328; see also Sandra González-Bailón, Social 
Science in the Era of Big Data, 5 POL’Y & INTERNET 147, 148 (2013) (“[W]hat makes 
Big Data unique is their higher level of detail and refinement in the quality of 
observations, not just the number of data points or the amount of memory that their 
storage takes.”). 
 
12 See González-Bailón, supra note 11, at 148. 
 
13 See Menchen-Trevino, supra note 10, at 329. 
 
14 See, e.g., González-Bailón, supra note 11, at 147–48 (discussing “end of theory” 
arguments); see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 70 (“In the 
future, our understanding will be driven more by the abundance of data rather than by 
hypotheses.”); Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the 
Scientific Method Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008), 
http://archive.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory, archived at 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 4 
 
 6 
interactions add to social dynamics “with an impressive level of detail.”15 
 
[6] Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier provide a brief 
analysis of the promise—and the peril—of big data predictive analytics.  
Prior to big data, analytics relied on determining whether an individual 
was part of a group; for example, actuarial tables indicate that men over 
fifty years of age are more prone to colon cancer, so all men over fifty 
may pay more for health insurance.
16
  In contrast, big data analysis is non-
causal, identifying individuals—rather than groups—from a vast array of 
data.
17
  Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier argue that, on the plus side, this 
makes profiling much more accurate, less discriminatory, and more 
individualized.
18
  For example, rather than identifying an individual as a 
terrorist threat due to his or her nationality or religion, additional data 
points such as body language and other physiological patterns can be 
analyzed to make a more accurate determination of a possible threat.
19
  On 
the down side, it may lead some to predict behavior based on mere 
                                               
http://perma.cc/Z4UD-6X4L (claiming that “faced with massive data, this approach to 
science—hypothesize, model, test—is becoming obsolete”).  “We can throw the numbers 
into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms 
find patterns where science cannot.”  Id. 
 
15 González-Bailón, supra note 11, at 148. 
 
16 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 160. 
 
17 See id. 
 
18 See id. at 161. 
 
19 See id. at 159–61; see generally Matthew L. Jensen et al., Automatic, Multimodal 
Evaluation of Human Interaction, 19 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 367 (2010) 
(outlining an approach for automatically extracting behavioral indicators from video, 
audio, and text and exploring the possibility of using those indicators to predict certain 
human-interpretable judgments); Thomas O. Meservy et al., Deception Detection 
Through Automatic, Unobtrusive Analysis of Nonverbal Behavior, 20 IEEE INTELLIGENT 
SYS. 36, 36 (2005) (discussing the theory underlying an automated system that can infer 
deception or truthfulness from a set of features extracted from head and hands 
movements in a video). 
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probabilities; big data analytics can only “predict that for a specific 
individual, a particular future behavior has a certain probability.”20  
 
[7] Predictive analytics are not perfect.  While they may reveal hidden 
correlations, there may be no causation.  For example, Google engineers 
found a correlation between Google flu-related searches and outbreaks of 
the flu, identifying flu outbreaks before the Centers for Disease Control.
21
  
However, the engineers did not examine what caused those searches.  For 
example, a few years later, Google’s predictive capabilities came into 
question when it drastically overestimated peak flu levels based on search 
queries, most likely because Google’s algorithms did not sufficiently take 
into consideration people who were not suffering from the flu conducting 
flu-related searches due to higher than usual press coverage of a flu 
outbreak.
22
  “Imputing true causality in big data is a research field in its 
infancy.”23  In addition, while there may be a lot of data, they are not 
always complete or accurate and may contain outliers—all of which can 
lower the performance of data mining algorithms.
24
   
 
III.  PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS AND PRIVACY 
 
[8] In the early years of America as a colony and a nation, privacy was 
                                               
20 MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 161.  Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier remind us that numbers are far more fallible than we sometimes think.  See 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 163. 
 
21 See Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Letter to the Editor, Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using 
Search Engine Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1012–13 (2009) (arguing it is possible to 
use search queries to detect influenza epidemics in areas with a large population of web 
search users). 
 
22 See Declan Butler, When Google Got Flu Wrong, 494 NATURE 155, 155 (2013) 
(arguing that mining web and social media data for flu-tracking can only compliment, not 
substitute for, traditional epidemiological surveillance networks). 
 
23 BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 25. 
 
24 See id.  
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a relatively minor social concern in light of social norms.  Church elders 
would regularly visit the homes of parishioners to ensure proper living;
25
 
family members, as well as visiting guests, would often sleep in the same 
beds;
26
 and Henry Ford would send his “sociological investigators” to the 
homes of workers to ensure proper living before extending a wage 
bonus.
27
  America’s open frontier provided its own natural solitude. 28  
Privacy was primarily limited to admonishing eavesdroppers—those who 
would stand outside the open eaves of a home and listen to the 
conversations within.
29
  
 
[9] When Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis proposed a “right to be 
let alone” in their seminal article The Right to Privacy,30 it was in reaction 
to new intrusive technologies: “[i]nstantaneous photographs and 
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good 
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed 
                                               
25 See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 8–10 (2000). 
 
26 See id. at 19–20 (discussing the practice of bed-sharing primarily due to the lack of 
beds and for warmth). 
 
27 See, e.g., STEPHEN MEYER III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY: LABOR MANAGEMENT AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY 1908–1921, at 124–26 (1981); see also 
Samuel M. Levin, Ford Profit Sharing, 1914–1920, 6 PERSONNEL J. 75, 78 (1927). 
 
28 See SMITH, supra note 25, at 76; see also Thomas H. O’Connor, The Right to Privacy 
in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS. L. Q. 101, 104–05 (1968) (asserting that, particularly 
as a result of the Louisiana Purchase, “the solitary isolation of the explorers, the pioneers, 
and the settlers of the West was so absolute that privacy was assured by the very physical 
dimensions which circumscribed the frontier”). 
 
29 See, e.g., DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1978) 
(citing Commonwealth v. Lovett, 6 PA. L.J. 226, 226–28 (1847)). 
 
30 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193, 205 (1891). 
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from the house-tops.’” 31   The latter half of the nineteenth century 
witnessed a change in society fueled by technological advancements, 
including the instant camera,
32
 which itself helped fuel a profusion of 
newspapers and magazines satisfying an insatiable demand for gossip and 
intimate portrayals.
33
 
 
[10] Soon, “[a]cceptance of the right to privacy ha[d] grown with the 
increasing capability of the mass media and electronic devices with their 
capacity to destroy an individual’s anonymity, intrude upon his most 
intimate activities, and expose his most personal characteristics to public 
gaze.”34  Now, in the twenty-first century, almost all aspects of modern 
                                               
31 Id. at 195. 
 
32 See, e.g., Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the 
Right to Privacy in New York, 1885–1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 25 (1991) (discussing the 
impact of unprecedented technological change upon the public’s psyche). 
 
33 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every 
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.  Gossip is no longer the 
resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with 
industry as well as effrontery.  To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are 
spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers.  To occupy the indolent, column 
upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the 
domestic circle.”); see also Mensel, supra note 32, at 25 (arguing that “amateur 
photographers played an important role in provoking outrage among editorial 
commentators, judges, and legislators which eventually helped lead to the recognition of 
the right to privacy”). 
 
34 Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971).  In Briscoe, the 
California Supreme Court considered whether publication of a criminal’s past 
involvement in a crime could constitute an invasion of privacy if the incident was no 
longer newsworthy.  See id. at 43–44.  Briscoe was overruled by Gates v. Discovery 
Communications, Inc., in which the California Supreme Court ruled, under similar facts, 
that no invasion of privacy could occur when the broadcast in question relied on public 
records.  See Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 559–62 (Cal. 2004).  
“[A]n invasion of privacy claim based on allegations of harm caused by a media 
defendant’s publication of facts obtained from public official records of a criminal 
proceeding is barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”  Id. at 
562. 
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life are digitally recorded, stored, and analyzed—the collection of 
information about us is ubiquitous.
35
  Today, because of social media, 
mobile devices, surveillance devices, and networked sensors, individuals 
constantly emit information—whether they know it or not—that can be 
used or misused in a variety of ways.
36
 
 
[11] Most of the information we “emit” is digital—such as e-mail and 
text messages, mouse clicks and keystrokes, phone numbers dialed and 
calls received, and GPS location data—which can suffer from over-
collection and data fusion.  “Over-collection occurs when an engineering 
design intentionally, and sometimes clandestinely, collects information 
                                               
35 See BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 7, at ix (“The ubiquity of computing and 
electronic communication technologies has led to the exponential growth of data from 
both digital and analog sources.”); see also Diane Cardwell, At Newark Airport, the 
Lights Are On, and They’re Watching You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2014, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/business/at-newark-airport-the-lights-are-on-and-
theyre-watching-you.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TD3Y-FN7G (“Using an array of 
sensors and eight video cameras around the [Newark Airport] terminal, the light fixtures 
are part of a new wireless network that collects and feeds data into software that can spot 
long lines, recognize license plates and even identify suspicious activity, sending alerts to 
the appropriate staff.”); Robert Faturechi, Use of License Plate Photo Databases Is 
Raising Privacy Concerns, L.A. TIMES (May 18, 2014, 9:29 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-law-enforcement-contractors-20140518-
story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A64W-2D3Z (reporting that the technology used 
in Los Angeles automatically captures digital images of license plates tagged with time 
and location, which is then transmitted to searchable databases used by police officers to 
track past whereabouts of drivers); Steve Lohr, Big Data: Rise of the Machines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/big-data-rise-of-the-
machines, archived at http://perma.cc/37SC-9H26 (“The ubiquity of sensors is new. . . .  
The sensors make it possible to get data we never had before.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Zach Church, Google’s Schmidt: ‘Global Mind’ Offers New Opportunities, 
MIT NEWS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2011/schmidt-event-
1115.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3AKD-FX7P (“Technology is not really about 
hardware and software any more . . . .  It’s really about the mining and use of this 
enormous [volume of] data [in order to] make the world a better place.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
36 See BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 19. 
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unrelated to its stated purpose.”37  For example, does your smart phone 
camera record your facial expressions while it records your keystrokes 
when you type a text message?
38
  In March 2014, the FTC filed a 
complaint against the maker of the “Brightest Flashlight App,” a popular 
Google Android app that would activate all the lights on a mobile device, 
while also transmitting the device’s geolocation to third parties, including 
advertising networks.
39
  Data fusion occurs when data collected from 
different sources for different reasons are brought together, resulting in 
data-rich profiles and new ways of tracking.
40
  “[T]he privacy challenges 
from data fusion do not lie in the individual data streams . . . .  Rather, the 
privacy challenges are emergent properties of our increasing ability to 
bring into analytical juxtaposition large, diverse data sets and to process 
them with new kinds of mathematical algorithms.”41 
                                               
37 Id. at 21. 
 
38 See, e.g., BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 21; see also Raffi Khatchadourian, 
We Know How You Feel, NEW YORKER (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/19/know-feel, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8PMS-K3T8 (reporting on technology that can identify emotions in real 
time based on facial expressions: “The process requires machine learning, in which 
computers find patterns in large tranches of data, and then use those patterns to interpret 
new data.”). 
 
39 See Complaint at 2, In re Goldenshores Tech., L.L.C., No. C-4446 (F.T.C. Mar. 31, 
2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409goldenshorescmpt.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/9HWU-NG6G.  The FTC entered a settlement with Goldenshores 
Technologies that requires it to delete personal information collected from consumers as 
well as provide a just-in-time disclosure that fully informs consumers when, how, and 
why their geolocation information is being collected, used and shared, and requires 
defendants to obtain consumers’ affirmative express consent before doing so.  See 
Decision and Order at 4, In re Goldenshores Tech., L.L.C., No. C-4446 (F.T.C. Mar. 31, 
2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409goldenshoresdo.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y6FW-C2M4. 
 
40 See BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 21. 
 
41 Id. 
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[12] This is one way in which predictive analytics contribute to online 
tracking.
42
  One does not even have to shop online to be targeted by 
predictive analytics.  Perhaps the most famous—and chilling—example 
comes from Target Corporation’s use of analytics to predict its shoppers’ 
future buying habits.  Target—like all other retailers—understands that 
many consumers’ buying habits are ingrained and difficult to change.43  
But, one particular moment when buying habits can change significantly is 
the birth of a child.  Most marketers are reactive, and send coupons and 
advertisements after the birth of the child based on public birth records.  
Target sought to be proactive—predicting when shoppers, based on 
buying habits,
44
 are pregnant.
45
  Unfortunately, Target’s analytics were so 
                                               
42 See, e.g., Julie Brill, Competition and Consumer Protection: Strange Bedfellows or 
Best Friends?, 10 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, at 7, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Dec10_Brill12
_21f.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/45VS-UX28 (“In recent years, 
advances in computer technology have made it possible for detailed information about 
consumers to be stored, sold, shared, aggregated, and used more easily and cheaply than 
ever, in ways not feasible, or even conceivable, before.  These advances in technology 
have allowed online companies to engage in targeted advertising, a practice that has 
many important benefits. . . .  Yet serious privacy concerns arise when companies can 
easily collect, combine, and use so much information from consumers.”). 
 
43 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q6RQ-5Q67. 
 
44 See id.  Whenever possible, Target assigns each shopper a unique code that tracks 
every purchase and which is linked to individual demographic information, such as age, 
marriage status, neighborhood, estimated salary, credit cards used, and Web sites visited.  
See id.   
Target can buy data about your ethnicity, job history, the magazines 
you read, if you’ve ever declared bankruptcy or got divorced, the year 
you bought (or lost) your house, where you went to college, what kinds 
of topics you talk about online, whether you prefer certain brands of 
coffee, paper towels, cereal or applesauce, your political leanings, 
reading habits, charitable giving and the number of cars you own. 
Id. 
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good it informed a father of his daughter’s pregnancy before he even knew 
about it.
46
  As the Target incident illustrates, predictive analytics can 
create a risk of revealing intimate personal information before it becomes 
publicly available,
47
 even when the original data is non-personally 
identifiable.
48
 
                                               
45 See id.  Rather than be among the multiple marketers sending materials post-birth, 
Target wanted to target (pun intended) women in their second trimester, which is when 
most expectant mothers begin buying all new and different items, such as prenatal 
vitamins and maternity clothing.  See id.  
 
46 See Duhigg, supra note 43 (relating how an irate father complained to Target that it 
was encouraging his teenage daughter to get pregnant by sending her coupons for 
maternity and baby clothes and cribs, only to find out later that his daughter was indeed 
pregnant).  But see Tim Harford, Big Data: Are We Making a Big Mistake?, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 29, 2014, 11:38 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3TwAfkZFe, archived at http://perma.cc/2JAW-ZFTK (arguing 
that pregnant women receive pregnancy-related coupons because everyone on Target’s 
mailing list receives such coupons; suggesting further that Target mixes pregnancy-
related coupons with other unrelated coupons not to avoid upsetting pregnant women 
who would receive only pregnancy-related coupons but because the coupons will be sent 
to women who are not pregnant); cf. Jessica Goldstein, Meet the Woman Who Did 
Everything in Her Power to Hide Her Pregnancy from Big Data, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 
29, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2014/04/29/3432050/can-you-hide-
from-big-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/R7Q7-KEQJ (reporting on the efforts of Jane 
Vertesi, Princeton University Assistant Professor of Sociology, to prevent “big data” 
from finding out she was pregnant, and who found hiding from “big data” extremely 
inconvenient and expensive, besides nearly impossible). 
 
47 See BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS, supra note 4, at 2 (“[T]he power of analytics, rich data 
stores and the insights they can yield raise risks to privacy.”); Tene & Polonetsky, supra 
note 8, at 253–54 (“It is one thing to recommend for a customer books, music or movies 
she might be interested in based on her previous purchases; it is quite another thing to 
identify when she is pregnant before her closest family knows.”).   
 
48 See BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS, supra note 4, at 2; see also Justin Brickell & Vitaly 
Shmatikov, The Cost of Privacy: Destruction of Data-Mining Utility in Anonymized Data 
Publishing (Aug. 2008) (presented at 14th Annual ACM SIGKDD Conference on 
Knowledge, Discovery and Data Mining in Las Vegas, Nev), available at 
http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~nemo/anonymity/papers/jlbrick_kdd2008.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q8LA-3HNY (“[E]ven modest privacy gains require almost complete 
destruction of the data-mining utility.”).  See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of 
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Application of analytics to big data does not conform well 
to traditional legal approaches because big data does not 
result from one-on-one interaction between the data 
controller and the individual.  Big data instead pulls in 
information from disparate sources. Its value derives not 
only from its volume, but also from its varied and 
expansive scope—big data brings together an enormous 
pool of information that initially may seem unrelated.
49
 
A.  The Public/Private Dichotomy and the Third-Party 
Doctrine 
 
[13] The principal privacy conundrum posed by predictive analytics is 
that data mining relies to a large extent on “public” information—it 
derives from transactions and social interactions that are often generally 
observable.  “A matter that is already public or that has previously become 
part of the public domain is not private.”50  While total secrecy is not 
required—information disclosed to a few people may remain private51—if 
even only a few people actually see the information, privacy can be lost if 
the potential audience is large.
52
  W.A. Parent expressly excludes 
information in the public domain from his definition of privacy, 
considering it a “glaring paradox.”53  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz considers the 
                                               
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
1701, 1706–07 (2010) (demonstrating that cross-linking supposedly anonymous data 
among databases can “de-anonymize” the data). 
 
49 BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS, supra note 4, at 11. 
 
50 Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 
51 See id. at 863 (citing M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001)).  
 
52 See id. at 863 (holding that posting information to MySpace opened it to the public at 
large, even if it was removed a few days later and was seen by only a few people). 
 
53 W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 271 (1983). 
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boundary between public and private “the fundamental, first-principles 
question in privacy law.”54  This public/private dichotomy is reflected in a 
number of court decisions: “objects, activities, or statements that [one] 
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’”;55 “whatever 
the public may see from a public place cannot be private”;56 and watching 
an appellee and videotaping his activities while he was outside his home, 
in his front yard, where he was exposed to public view was not an 
actionable invasion of privacy.
57
  Indeed, one court has gone so far as to 
hold there was no reasonable expectation of privacy where a woman was 
recorded by a secretly installed camera while changing clothes in an office 
area, despite locking the door, because others had a key to the office and 
could have walked in at any moment.
58
 
 
[14] Closely related to the public/private dichotomy is the so-called 
“third-party doctrine,” which provides that private information disclosed 
to a third party can lose its privacy protection.  The doctrine originates in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, particularly in the following cases: On 
Lee v. United States, where the Supreme Court held there was no Fourth 
Amendment protection in a confidential conversation recorded by an 
informant;
59
 United States v. Miller, where the Supreme Court held that 
                                               
54 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
920 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 
55
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 
56 N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 732 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
 
57 See I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 689–90 (Ala. 2000). 
 
58 See Nelson v. Salem State Coll., 845 N.E.2d 338, 346–47 (Mass. 2006). 
 
59 See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952) (“Petitioner was talking 
confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was overheard.  This was due 
to aid from a transmitter and receiver, to be sure, but with the same effect on his privacy 
as if agent Lee had been eavesdropping outside an open window.  The use of bifocals, 
field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a witness’ vision is not a forbidden 
search or seizure, even if they focus without his knowledge or consent upon what one 
supposes to be private indiscretions.”).  But cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–
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the Fourth Amendment does not require the government to obtain a 
warrant to seize bank records;
60
 and Smith v. Maryland, where the Court 
held that dialed telephone numbers have no constitutional protection.
61
 
 
[15] The third-party doctrine is not without its critics.
62
  One argument 
                                               
35 (2001) (holding that use of thermal imaging technology constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 
60 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third-party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will 
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.”).  Miller’s holding was limited by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 
by—for example—requiring the Government authority to notify the bank customer of the 
subpoena or summons served on the financial institution as well as the nature of the law 
enforcement inquiry to which the subpoena or summons relates.  See Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012)). 
 
61 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–46 (1979) (“Although petitioner’s conduct 
may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct 
was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he 
dialed.  Regardless of his location [i.e., whether in his home or some other location], 
petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same way 
if he wished to complete his call.”).  But see Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3121–23) (2012)) (requiring government authorities to obtain a court order prior to 
recording telephone numbers dialed). 
 
62 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless a person is 
prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity 
[i.e., the telephone], he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.”); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 790 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The interest On Lee fails to 
protect is the expectation of the ordinary citizen, who has never engaged in illegal 
conduct in his life, that he may carry on his private discourse freely, openly, and 
spontaneously without measuring his every word against the connotations it might carry 
when instantaneously heard by others unknown to him and unfamiliar with his situation 
or analyzed in a cold, formal record played days, months, or years after the conversation. 
Interposition of a warrant requirement is designed not to shield ‘wrongdoers,’ but to 
secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security throughout our society.”); cf. 
Frank Rich, Chris Rock Talks to Frank Rich about Ferguson, Cosby, and What ‘Racial 
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particularly germane to this article is that privacy does not require total 
secrecy and that exposure to a limited audience does not equate to 
exposure to the world at large.
63
 
 
[16] In contrast, Orin Kerr argues the third-party doctrine prevents 
“savvy wrongdoers” from using “third-party services in a tactical way to 
                                               
Progress’ Really Means, VULTURE (Nov. 30, 2014, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.vulture.com/2014/11/chris-rock-frank-rich-in-conversation.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/23Z4-SA8T (“You can’t think the thoughts you want to think if you think 
you’re being watched.”). 
 
63 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 140 (2006) (“Information privacy does not mean refusing to 
share information with everyone. . . .  One must not confuse solitude with secrecy; they 
are distinct forms of privacy.”); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual 
Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
119, 122–23 (2002) (arguing that “treating exposure to a limited audience as identical to 
exposure to the world” fails “to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth Amendment 
context;” noting for example, that giving a neighbor keys to one’s house so the neighbor 
can water the plants while the owner is away does not grant the neighbor permission to 
invite friends into the owner’s house); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the 
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1086–87 (2002) 
(“The [Supreme] Court’s current conception of privacy is as a form of total secrecy.  As 
conceived by the Court, an individual’s hidden world should be protected.  It has 
expressed an interest in safeguarding the intimate information that individuals carefully 
conceal.  Privacy is about protecting the skeletons that are meticulously hidden in the 
closet.  Since information maintained by third parties is exposed to others, it is not 
private, and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  This conception of 
privacy is not responsive to life in the modern Information Age.”).  But see State v. Carle, 
337 P.3d 904, 911 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that because defendant had no 
privacy interest in the digital copy of the text message found on the recipient’s phone, 
police did not conduct a “search” under the Fourth Amendment when they viewed that 
text message on recipient’s phone); State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 56 (R.I. 2014) (holding 
that a sender of text messages has no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in those 
messages stored on the recipient’s phone, “[b]ecause the recipient now shares full control 
of whether to share or disseminate the sender’s message, the sender, to be sure, no longer 
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the message contained 
on the recipient’s device.”); State v. Marcum, 319 P.3d 681, 687 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014) 
(holding defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone company’s records 
of defendant’s text messages from account of co-defendant). 
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enshroud the entirety of their crimes in zones of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”64  However, the Supreme Court may ultimately recognize that 
modern technology may finally impose a limit on the Fourth 
Amendment’s third-party doctrine: 
 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.  This 
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
65  
 
[17] The third-party doctrine has been applied in common law privacy 
cases as well.  For example, the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey dismissed a plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim 
against her employer in relation to restricted-access Facebook posts 
because a person allowed to view those posts had provided them to her 
employer.
66
  In Sumien v. CareFlite, the Texas Court of Appeals refused 
                                               
64 Orin S. Kerr, The Case For The Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564–65 
(2009) (also arguing that the third-party doctrine provides clarity by focusing on the 
information’s knowable location rather than its unknowable history).  For further 
elaboration and debate regarding Kerr’s arguments, see Richard A. Epstein, Symposium, 
Security Breach Notification Six Years Later: Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from 
the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1200–02 
(2009) (stating “[i]nsofar as Kerr shifts away from reasonable expectations to either 
assumption of risk or to consent, he cannot build an adequate foundation for Fourth 
Amendment Law.”); Erin Murphy, Security Breach Notification Six Years Later: The 
Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1241–44 (2009) (stating that it “is not clear that third-party 
participation makes policing all that harder or easier.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, 
Symposium, Security Breach Notification Six Years Later: Defending The Third-Party 
Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229, 1230–36 
(2009) (addressing the concerns raised by Epstein and Murphy). 
 
65 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
 
66 See Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 673–74 
(D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he evidence shows that Defendants were the passive recipients of 
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to recognize a right of privacy in Facebook posts viewed by a friend-of-a-
friend.
67
 
 
[18] Big data and its associated predictive analytics extend the privacy 
concern beyond discrete events and transactions—a concern perhaps best 
described by a fictional professor describing his forthcoming book The 
Defeat of Privacy: 
 
It’s about the fact that there are no more private selves, no 
more private corners in society, no more private properties, 
no more private acts. . . .  Mankind is making everything 
open and accessible. . . .  There are no concealments any 
longer, no mysterious dark places of the soul.  We’re all 
right there in front of the entire audience of the universe, in 
a state of exposure.  We’re all nude and available.68 
 
                                               
information that they did not seek out or ask for.  Plaintiff voluntarily gave information to 
her Facebook friend, and her Facebook friend voluntarily gave that information to 
someone else.  This may have been a violation of trust, but it was not a violation of 
privacy.”). 
 
67 See Sumien v. CareFlite, No. 02–12–00039–CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5331, at *6–7 
(Tex. Ct. App. July 5, 2012).  But cf. Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness 
Boot Camp, LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“There is no sound basis to 
argue that Fell [plaintiff’s former employee], by inadvertently leaving his Hotmail 
password accessible, was thereby authorizing access to all of his Hotmail e-mails, no less 
the e-mails in his two other accounts.  If he had left a key to his house on the front desk at 
[Pure Power Boot Camp], one could not reasonably argue that he was giving consent to 
whoever found the key, to use it to enter his house and rummage through his belongings.  
And, to take the analogy a step further, had the person rummaging through the belongings 
in Fell’s house found the key to Fell’s country house, could that be taken as authorization 
to search his country house.  We think not.”); Colb, supra note 63, at 122–23.     
 
68 MALCOLM BRADBURY, THE HISTORY MAN 73 (1976) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  When the person to whom the fictional professor is describing his book asks, 
“You mean there isn’t a me anymore?” the professor responds, “You’re there, you’re 
present . . . but you happen to be a conjunction of known variables . . . .”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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In light of ever-developing technologies that provide ubiquitous tracking 
and data collection, perhaps, as Justice Sotomayor intimated, it is time to 
reexamine the public/private dichotomy and third-party doctrine.  This 
reexamination is currently taking place in Fourth Amendment cases and 
can easily be applied to common law privacy. 
 
 B.  “Public” Data and the Mosaic Theory 
 
[19] In 2001, Daniel Solove identified the risk to privacy imposed by 
data analytics: “It is ever more possible to create an electronic collage that 
covers much of a person’s life—a life captured in records, a digital 
biography composed in the collective computer networks of the world.”69 
Herman Tavani succinctly summarizes the fundamental conundrum 
between data mining (and implicitly predictive analytics) and privacy: 
 
Unlike personal data that reside in explicit records in 
databases, information acquired about persons via data 
mining is often derived from implicit patterns in the data.  
The patterns can suggest “new” facts, relationships, or 
associations about a person, placing that person in a “newly 
discovered” category or group.  Also, because most 
personal data collected and used in data mining 
applications is considered neither confidential nor intimate 
in nature, there is a tendency to presume that such data 
must by default be public data.  And unlike the personal 
data that are often exchanged between or across two or 
more databases in traditional database retrieval processes, 
in the data mining process personal data are often 
manipulated within a single database, and typically within a 
large data warehouse.
70
 
 
                                               
69 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001). 
 
70 TAVANI, supra note 3, at 151. 
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[20] Derived from government surveillance cases,
71
 the “mosaic 
theory” recognizes that continual surveillance of a suspect’s public 
movements “reveals far more than the individual movements [the whole] 
comprises.”72  The current leading Fourth Amendment case espousing the 
mosaic theory is United States v. Maynard, in which law enforcement 
agents tracked a suspect continuously for a month using a GPS device 
attached to his car.
73
  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
the GPS tracking constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, and therefore required a warrant.
74
  While the U.S. Supreme 
                                               
71 See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“It requires little reflection 
to understand that the business of foreign intelligence gathering in this age of computer 
technology is more akin to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a 
cloak and dagger affair.  Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous 
information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the 
unseen whole must operate.”); see also Halperin v. C.I.A., 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (“We must take into account . . . that each individual piece of intelligence 
information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits of 
information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.”) 
 
72 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that a list of telephone numbers dialed could 
“reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 
617 F.3d 1120, 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying petition for rehearing en banc) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“By tracking and recording the movements of millions of 
individuals the government can use computers to detect patterns and develop suspicions.  
It can also learn a great deal about us because where we go says much about who we are.  
Are Winston and Julia’s cell phones together near a hotel a bit too often?  Was Syme’s 
OnStar near an STD clinic?  Were Jones, Aaronson and Rutherford at that protest outside 
the White House?  The FBI need no longer deploy agents to infiltrate groups it considers 
subversive; it can figure out where the groups hold meetings and ask the phone company 
for a list of cell phones near those locations.”); In re United States Order Authorizing the 
Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584–86, 589–95 (E.D.N.Y 
2010) (applying Maynard analysis in to order to determine the difference between 
historical and perspective tracking; surveillance and disclosure; precision capabilities of 
CSI and GPS; and vehicle and telephone trafficking). 
 
73 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549. 
 
74 See id. at 555–56, 563 (“Society recognizes [the suspect’s] expectation of privacy in 
his movements over the course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the GPS device 
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Court affirmed Maynard, it did not do so under the mosaic theory—it 
instead held that the agents needed a warrant because they physically 
trespassed when they placed the GPS on the suspect’s car.75  However, in 
his concurrence with the judgment, Justice Alito expressly stated that he 
would “analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether 
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-
term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”76  Justice 
Alito suggested that the majority’s “reasoning largely disregards what is 
really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) 
and instead attaches great significance to something that most would view 
as relatively minor”—the attaching to the bottom of a car the GPS device 
itself.
77
  And as noted earlier, Justice Sotomayor expressed her opinion “it 
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.”78 
                                               
to monitor those movements defeated that reasonable expectation. . . .  [P]rolonged GPS 
monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have 
. . . .”); see also Benjamin Zhu, Note, A Traditional Tort for a Modern Threat: Applying 
Intrusion upon Seclusion to Dataveillance Observations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2405–
06 (2014) (“Maynard implicitly recognizes that an individual may have a privacy interest 
in the inferences and new information that may be drawn from a collection of data, even 
if each piece of data had been disclosed to the public.”).  
 
75 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 950 n.3 (“Where, as here, the Government obtains 
information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area . . . a search 
[requiring a warrant] has undoubtedly occurred.”).  Indeed, the majority openly skirted 
what many commentators and Court observers considered to be the key issue in the case: 
“It may be that achieving the same result [i.e., continuous surveillance for a 4-week 
period] through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer 
that question.”  Id. at 954. 
 
76 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 
77 Id. at 961.  Justice Alito noted that the basis for the Court’s holding in Jones would be 
inapplicable once all cars were fitted with GPS devices.  See id. 
 
78 See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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[21] One can also perhaps glean some insight into the Supreme Court’s 
concern over Fourth Amendment privacy and evolving technology in 
Riley v. California, in which the Court held that warrantless searches of 
cell phones incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.
79
  As a 
general matter, police officers do not need a warrant to search a person 
and the immediately surrounding area incident to an arrest in order to 
secure the officers’ safety and prevent the destruction evidence. 80   In 
Riley, the Supreme Court concluded that neither risk exists when the 
search is of digital data.
81
  Ultimately, “when ‘privacy-related concerns are 
weighty enough’ a ‘search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the 
diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.’”82 
 
[22] Importantly, at least for the arguments made in this article, Justice 
Robert’s opinion recognizes that collected data can be different:83 
 
The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated 
consequences for privacy.  First, a cell phone collects in 
one place many distinct types of information—an address, 
a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that 
reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.  
Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type 
of information to convey far more than previously possible.  
The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed 
                                               
79 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480, 2493 (2014).  Seven Justices joined 
Chief Justice Robert’s opinion, with Justice Alito concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment.  See id. at 2480.  Riley consolidated two cell phone search cases, one involving 
a smart phone and one involving a flip phone.  See id. at 2480–81. 
 
80 See id., 134 S. Ct. at 2483 (citing Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)). 
 
81 See id. at 2484–85. 
 
82 Id. at 2488 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013)). 
 
83 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”).  
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through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, 
locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a 
photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.  
Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of 
the phone, or even earlier.  A person might carry in his 
pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he 
would not carry a record of all his communications with 
Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely 
be kept on a phone.
84
  
 
[23] Analogous to ubiquitous monitoring, Chief Justice Roberts 
additionally noted the pervasiveness of data collected through cell phones: 
“Today . . . it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of 
American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital 
record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the 
intimate.”85  Chief Justice Roberts noted also the qualitative difference in 
stored data (in this case, on a cell phone):  
 
An Internet search and browsing history . . . could reveal an 
individual’s private interests or concerns . . . .  Data on a 
cell phone can also reveal where a person has been.  
Historic location information . . . can reconstruct 
someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not 
only around town but also within a particular building.
86
 
 
                                               
84 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
85 Id. at 2490 (2014); see also United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(holding suspect had privacy right in cell phone data; likening a cell phone to a personal 
computer carried on one’s person; noting “cell phones contain a wealth of private 
information, including e[-]mails, text messages, call histories, address books, and 
subscriber numbers.”); State v. Marcum, 319 P.3d 681, 685–87 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014) 
(reviewing various state courts which have recognized privacy interests in cell phone 
data). 
 
86 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
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[24] Based on Riley’s discussion of the expanding quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of stored data, it is logical to surmise that if the 
Supreme Court had addressed the substantive privacy issues in Jones, it 
very likely might have adopted the mosaic theory–particularly in light of 
Justice Alito’s and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrences. 87   One 
distinguishing factor in “mosaic” cases is the length of surveillance.  
“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public 
streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable.  But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”88  
Indeed this was one of Justice Scalia’s objections to applying the theory—
“it remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is ‘surely’ too 
long.”89  This may be an issue within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
but it should not be in the context of private-party data tracking and 
analysis—it is now ubiquitous and fundamentally unavoidable. 
 
[25] Within the context of private-party data tracking and analysis, the 
mosaic theory is less about length than extremity.  New York courts in 
particular have recognized a common law privacy invasion resulting from 
overly zealous surveillance of “public” conduct.90  For example, in Nader 
v. General Motors Corporation, in which General Motors had hired 
                                               
87 Cf. Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and The Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
691, 701 (Dec. 2014) (concluding that while cases such as Jones and Riley “suggest that 
the Court is aware that modern surveillance technologies represent a problem for 
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, but is still casting about for a solution that might 
prove workable in the context of data mining.”). 
 
88 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(“For… [most] offenses, society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and 
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”). 
 
89 Id. at 954. 
 
90 See generally Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) 
(discussing how surveillance in public places may be so “overzealous” that it could be 
rendered as actionable). 
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private investigators to follow Ralph Nader, a critic of General Motors, 
and interview his acquaintances, the New York Court of Appeals 
concluded that surveillance of public activities could rise to the level of an 
invasion of privacy.
91
  “[I]t is manifest that the mere observation of the 
plaintiff in a public place does not amount to an invasion of his privacy.  
But, under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as 
to render it actionable.” 92   Judge Breitel elaborated: “Although acts 
performed in ‘public’, especially if taken singly or in small numbers, may 
not be confidential, at least arguably a right to privacy may nevertheless 
be invaded through extensive or exhaustive monitoring and cataloguing of 
acts normally disconnected and anonymous.”93  Similarly, in Galella v. 
Onassis, a photographer who had stalked former First Lady Jacqueline 
Onassis to such an extent that he could comment “at considerable length 
on her personality, her shopping tastes and habits, and her preferences for 
entertainment,” had invaded Onassis’s privacy.94 
 
[26] The Supreme Court has expanded the concept that some public 
information can be private.  Recognizing that “both the common law and 
the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of 
                                               
91 Id. at 770–71 (applying District of Columbia law). 
 
92 Id. (citing Pinkerton Nat’l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 132 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1963) (holding that allegations that insurer had detective agency constantly shadow 
woman after she filed personal injury action against the insurer in a manner calculated to 
frighten her and give her neighbors the impression that she was engaged in some 
wrongful activity were sufficient for a claim of invasion of privacy)). 
 
93 Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 772 (Breitel, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (noting that 
the New York Court of Appeals did rule, though, that the investigators’ interviewing Mr. 
Nader’s acquaintances did not violate his privacy and that “[i]nformation about the 
plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private to the 
plaintiff”). 
 
94 See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (applying New York 
law) (“The surveillance, close-shadowing and monitoring were clearly “overzealous” and 
therefore actionable.”), aff’d in relevant part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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information concerning his or her person”95 in Department of Justice v. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Justice Stevens focused on 
“whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters 
the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that information.” 96  
Recognizing that complete computerized dossiers are now available at 
one’s fingertips, 97  Justice Stevens concluded that the Freedom of 
Information Act’s exemptions from disclosure recognize “the power of 
compilations to affect personal privacy that outstrips the combined power 
of the bits of information contained within.” 98   Fundamentally, the 
Supreme Court has “recognized the privacy interest inherent in the 
nondisclosure of certain information even where the information may have 
been at one time public.”99 
 
[27] Extensive data mining and the use of predictive analytics appear to 
fit squarely within the concerns expressed by advocates of the mosaic 
theory, as well as those who have expressed similar concerns regarding 
data agglomeration.  Citizens should not have to fear that personal and 
intimate details of their lives will be revealed through the collection, 
storage, and analysis of virtually all of the mundane acts of life.
100
  For all 
                                               
95 Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989). 
 
96 Id. at 764 (1989) (noting “there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local 
police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information”) (applying the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 
89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012))). 
 
97 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Files: Legal Controls Over The Accuracy and Accessibility 
of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 343 (1966). 
 
98 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 765 (applying 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(3)). 
 
99 Id. at 767; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (“We are not unaware of 
the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information 
in computerized data banks or other massive government files.”). 
 
100 Indeed, one court has applied Riley.  See Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc., No. 
3:13CV1049 (JCH) 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86761, at *8–9 (D. Conn. June 26, 2014); see 
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practical purposes, it is now impossible to avoid being tracked: 
 
Experience has shown that it is possible, but it’s really not 
easy, and it comes with a lot of sacrifices.  And it requires 
some technical skill.  So to that end, it’s my concern about 
the opt-out idea.  I don’t actually think it’s feasible for 
everyone to do this.  I don’t think that’s the answer.  I don’t 
think that’s the simple answer to the big data problem: that 
you can just turn this stuff off, that you cannot do the things 
that you clearly need to do for your daily life.  But I really 
want to emphasize, I did this [avoiding tracking] as an 
experiment to see what it would take, to see what these 
systems were demanding of us that we’d forgotten about, 
and how it is that they worked.  And so I don’t expect 
people to do this.  In fact, I wouldn’t recommend it.101 
 
[28] No one should be forced into the experimental “dilemma” 
attempted by Professor Vertesi of completely rejecting all aspects of 
modern life—from social communications to shopping—to avoid constant 
commercial surveillance.
102
  But in the workplace, we have even less 
control over the degree of monitoring that is taking place. 
                                               
also supra text accompanying notes 79–86 (discussing the holding of Riley).  In Bakhit v. 
Safety Marking, Inc., plaintiffs sought to view the contents of the cell phones of ten 
Safety Marking employees, seeking evidence of racially offensive text messages and 
images.  Bakhit, 2014 LEXIS 86761 at *3–4.  Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons denied 
(without prejudice) the plaintiff’s discovery request based, in part, on Riley, to protect the 
individual employees’ privacy interests in the contents of their cell phones.  See id. at *9–
10 
 
101 Goldstein, supra note 46; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Symposium, Privacy 
and Accountability in the 21st Century: Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot 
Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 273 (2012) (“[A]vertisers use new, relatively 
unknown technologies to track people, specifically because consumers have not heard of 
these techniques.  Furthermore, these technologies obviate choice mechanisms that 
consumers exercise.”). 
 
102 See Goldstein, supra note 46. 
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IV.  PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
[29] In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Frederick 
Taylor and his scientific management techniques sought to obtain 
maximum efficiency in industrial work—the one best way. 103   Under 
Taylor’s methodology, the principal tools of measurement and observation 
were the manager with a stopwatch.
104
  To the workers, the stopwatch 
“was a hideous invasion of privacy, an oppressive all-seeing eye that 
peered into their work lives, ripping at their dignity.”105 
 
[30] Fast forward to the twenty-first century.  Under what Simon Head 
describes as Computer Business Systems, the shop floor has moved into 
service-sector offices: 
 
With the coming of the networked computer with 
monitoring software attached, industrial regimes of 
quantification, targeting, and control now pervade the 
white-collar world: how many patients, litigants, customers 
with complaints, students with theses, and future home 
owners with mortgage applications have been processed or 
billed per day or week, and how many should be processed 
or billed, because the digital white-collar line is subject to 
speedup no less than its factory counterpart?
106
 
                                               
103 See Robert Kanigel, Taylor-Made: How The World’s First Efficiency Expert 
Refashioned Modern Life in His Own Image, 37 SCI. 13, 18–19 (1997). 
 
104 See ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE 
ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY 466 (1997). 
 
105 Id. 
 
106 SIMON HEAD, MINDLESS: WHY SMARTER MACHINES ARE MAKING DUMBER HUMANS 
5 (2014); see also Monika Bauerlein & Clara Jeffery, All Work and No Pay: The Great 
Speedup, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 2011, at 18, 19 (describing the modern phenomenon 
of speedup whereby workers are pressured to work more hours with no additional pay), 
available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/06/speed-up-american-workers-
long-hours, archived at http://perma.cc/G7MJ-PXTF. 
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 A.  Predictive Analytics: Surveillance on Steroids? 
 
[31] One commentator from Frederick Taylor’s era suggested that any 
system that schedules every movement so that a worker “is simply one of 
the gears in the operation of the machine” would not secure the best 
results in the long run.
107
  Adding big data and analytics to the mix may 
only compound the problems: 
 
Big Data also holds out the promise of, for instance, total 
supervision in the workplace.  Lest perfect surveillance of 
employees sound alarming, this new field is given the 
blandly technocratic name of “workforce science”.  Every 
phone call, email and even mouse-click of an employee can 
be stored and analysed to guide management in making 
decisions.  
 
So “workforce science” is a scaled-up and automated 
version of the “scientific management” promoted by 
Frederick Winslow Taylor in his highly influential 1911 
book, The Principles of Scientific Management, which 
recounted how he performed time-and-motion studies on 
labourers in order to get more work out of them.  It has 
since been alleged that Winslow fiddled the data, but that 
didn’t stop him becoming an eponym: “taylorisation” is the 
breaking-down of some activity into discrete repetitive 
units, supposedly to improve efficiency.  Big Data promises 
taylorisation on steroids.
108
 
                                               
107 I.B. Rich, A Point for Mr. Taylor, AM. MACHINIST 674 (Apr. 13, 1911).  
 
108 Steven Poole, The Digital Panopticon, NEW STATESMAN, May 24–30, 2013, at 24, 
available at http://www.newstatesman.com/sci-tech/sci-tech/2013/05/are-you-ready-era-
big-data, archived at http://perma.cc/2DPN-SBQC; see also Steve Johnson, Hidden 
Devices Scrutinize Employees, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 13, 2014, 5:58 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_27132016/hidden-devices-scrutinize-
employees?source=infinite, archived at http://perma.cc/B38Q-KA4B. 
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[32] Fundamentally, the “predictive” in predictive analytics is to predict 
human behavior.
109
  It can be used, for example, in predicting whether 
someone has all the skills and resources for a particular job opening.
110
  
Companies believe they can learn more about a potential employee by 
scouring the Internet compared to just reading a résumé.
111
  Résumés are 
not considered to be data intensive; instead Internet searches may reveal 
hints at implicit activity never mentioned in a résumé, such as active 
participation in relevant online forums or e-mail chat lists.
112
  LinkedIn, 
the popular professional social media site, generates more than half its 
revenue from selling its data to recruiters.
113
  On the flip side, predictive 
analytics can also be used to decide whether to dismiss an employee.
114
 
 
[33] At present, workplace predictive analytics focus primarily on 
collecting real-time data to improve productivity under the theory that the 
more a company knows about its employees the more it can understand 
their job performance.
115
  “You have to bring the same rigor you bring to 
                                               
109 See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 
1505 (2013) (discussing government-backed automated predictive initiatives to, for 
example, predict the spread of pandemics as well as future political and economic 
developments, based on data collected from Internet traffic, web searches, and Twitter 
and Facebook posts).   
 
110 See Max Nisen, Moneyball at Work: They’ve Discovered What Really Makes A Great 
Employee, BUS. INSIDER (May 6, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/big-
data-in-the-workplace-2013-5, archived at http://perma.cc/RT8L-BZT7. 
 
111 See id. (referring to resumes as “relics of the dark ages of recruiting”). 
 
112 See id. (noting that one startup “looks specifically at the quality of the code engineers 
put up on GitHub, a popular hosting service for software development projects, to find 
diamonds in the rough”). 
 
113 See id. 
 
114 See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 162. 
 
115 See Don Reisinger, Improving Employee Performance With Data Analysis, CIO 
INSIGHT (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.cioinsight.com/it-
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operations and finance to the analysis of people.”116  One study of “121 
million anonymous performance and behavioral records from . . . a 
company that provides workforce management information to companies 
through the use of big data” found the following: only fifty percent of 
hourly workers will remain with an employer for more than one year; 
employees who use Chrome or Firefox web browsers instead of 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer “stay at their jobs longer, miss fifteen 
percent fewer work days, and deliver higher customer satisfaction;” and 
“[e]mployees who use three to four social networks are more likely to 
perform better in their jobs than those who are less involved with social 
networks.”117  “An employee retention program developed by software 
company SAS, for example, crunches data on employees who have quit in 
the past five years—their skills, profiles, studies, and friendships.  Then it 
finds current employees with similar patterns.  Another SAS program 
pinpoints the workers most likely to suffer accidents.”118  Stephen Burks et 
al. combined personnel data from nine large firms in three industries (call-
centers, trucking, and high-tech) that spanned hundreds of thousands of 
workers and millions of applicants and concluded in part that, while 
referred applicants have similar skills to non-referred applicants, referred 
                                               
management/workplace/slideshows/improving-employee-performance-with-data-
analysis-09/, archived at http://perma.cc/X726-DKEX; see also Steve Lohr, Scientific 
Management Redux: The Difference Is In The Data, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 21, 2013, 
11:29 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/scientific-management-redux-the-
difference-is-in-the-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/BCD7-NLUA. 
 
116 Stephen Baker, Data Mining Moves to Human Resources, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 11, 
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2009-03-11/data-mining-moves-to-human-
resources, archived at http://perma.cc/5NRK-CXSW (quoting Rupert Bader, director of 
workforce planning at Microsoft) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
117 See Reisinger, supra note 115. Recall that data mining reveals correlations, not 
necessarily causation. See supra text accompanying notes 20–24.  
 
118 Baker, supra note 116. 
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applicants are most likely to be hired.
119
  Marjorie Laura Kane-Sellers 
applied predictive analytics to fourteen years of sales force retention data 
of a Fortune 500 company and concluded “training and development 
participation contributes more significantly to employee retention than 
salary and job title promotions to the firm’s ability to retain sales 
professionals.”120  And IBM analysts are reportedly charting the skills and 
experience of IBM’s entire workforce in an effort to predict skills that will 
be needed in the future.
121
 
 
[34] In a slightly different approach, Ben Waber analyzed career 
outcomes at three U.S. companies using sensor ID badges that monitor 
physical movement and detect conversations and speech patterns using a 
combination of infrared, Bluetooth, and microphone data.
122
  In addition to 
the sensor data, the researchers also looked at e-mail, instant message, and 
phone call data.
123
  Waber’s results focused on workplace performance 
versus limited career growth for women: at a banking call center women 
were measured as more productive than men, but women were 
disadvantaged when it came to winning promotions and reaching the 
                                               
119 See STEPHEN BURKS ET AL., THE FACTS ABOUT REFERRALS: TOWARD AN 
UNDERSTANDING OF EMPLOYEE REFERRAL NETWORKS 2 (2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2253738, archived at http://perma.cc/3MLK-YM3Z. 
 
120 Marjorie Laura Kane-Sellers, Predictive Models of Employee Voluntary Turnover in a 
North American Professional Sales Force Using Data-Mining Analysis, at iv, 8 (Aug. 
2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tex. A&M Univ.), available at 
https://repository.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1486/KANE-
SELLERS-DISSERTATION.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KMR3-UXYJ. 
 
121 See Baker, supra note 116.  
 
122 See Ben Waber, What Data Analytics Says About Gender Inequality In The 
Workplace, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-30/gender-inequality-in-the-workplace-
what-data-analytics-says, archived at http://perma.cc/9X79-ZNCS (noting the actual 
content of conversations was ignored to protect employee privacy).  See generally 
WABER, supra note 10, at 11–12 (discussing wearable sensor badges). 
 
123 See Waber, supra note 122.  
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upper echelons of management; at a pharmaceutical company, women 
were fractionally more likely to be promoted than men based on the 
researchers’ model, “[y]et only [thirteen] percent of top executives at the 
company are female despite a 50-50 gender split in the overall 
workforce.”124  
 
[35] Meanwhile, at companies embracing workforce analytics, every e-
mail, instant message, phone call, line of written code, and mouse-click 
can be collected and measured.
125
  Where a worker eats lunch during the 
workday may also be monitored and analyzed.
126
  Proponents of 
workplace predictive analytics acknowledge that extensive monitoring 
“could create a poisonous work environment, one in which people are 
constantly worried about being spied on and monitored down to the tiniest 
movement.”127 
 
[36] Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, suggests the worker is metaphorically behind a one-
way mirror: “You don’t know what data is being collected and how it is 
used.”128  And while proponents and practitioners of workplace analytics 
express concern for worker privacy,
129
 as discussed previously, 
                                               
124 Id. 
 
125 Cf. Steve Lohr, Big Data, Trying to Build Better Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/technology/big-data-trying-to-build-better-
workers.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/N4B2-VPN5 (explaining the concept of 
work-force science and how it is being used in business today). 
 
126 See WABER, supra note 10, at 73 (arguing eating lunch with work colleagues is more 
productive than eating alone at one’s desk).  
 
127 Id. at 180. 
 
128 Lohr, supra note 125. 
 
129 See, e.g., Waber, supra note 122 (noting that while examining speech patterns in 
conversations, researchers “ignored the actual content of conversations to protect 
privacy”). 
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anonymous data do not necessarily remain anonymous when combined 
with other data,
130
 and non-substantive data (such as phone call numbers 
dialed, websites visited, e-mail metadata) can reveal just as much personal 
and private information as the contents of communications themselves.
131
 
 
 B.  Predictive Analytics and Discrimination 
 
[37] Recall the study mentioned earlier indicating that employees who 
use Chrome or Firefox web browsers instead of Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer stay at their jobs longer, miss fifteen percent fewer work days, 
and deliver higher customer satisfaction.
132
  Could this finding prove to be 
self-fulfilling?  In other words, perhaps management begins treating 
employees using Internet Explorer differently—assuming they are less 
productive anyway and will probably quit soon—leading to dissatisfaction 
by those employees, lower productivity, and eventual dismissal.  Or 
perhaps the employer begins using this criterion (use of Internet Explorer) 
as a hiring factor.  However, what if an employee or job applicant uses 
Internet Explorer because it provides accessibility options that better 
accommodate the employee’s disability?  Is the employer discriminating 
on the basis of disability? 
 
[38] Federal law prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin,
133
 disability,
134
 age (if forty years or older),
135
 
                                               
130
 See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 
131 See sources cited supra note 72. 
 
132 See Reisinger, supra note 115.  
 
133 See The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253, 
255 (1964) (codified 42 U.S.C. §2000e(2) (2012)) [hereinafter “Title VII”]; Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).  
 
134 See Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C.§12112 (2012)). 
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genetic information,
136
 and military service.
137
  These laws expressly 
prohibit employers from making any employment-related decisions based 
solely or in part on an employee’s or job applicant’s membership in any of 
these enumerated “protected classes.”138  However, the Supreme Court 
                                               
135 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602-03 
(1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§632, 631(2012)). 
 
136 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 
Stat. 881, 883 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 
137 See The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-353 § 4301, 108 Stat. 3149, 3150, 3153 (1994) (codified at 38 U.S.C. 
§4311 (2012)). 
 
138 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (“No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . 
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less 
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such 
establishment for equal work . . . .”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for 
an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age . . . .”); 38 U.S.C. § 
4311(a) (2012) (“A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has 
performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed 
service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, 
promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that 
membership, application for membership, performance of service, application for service, 
or obligation.”) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (For purposes of 
Title VII, “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any employee with respect to the compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment of the employee, because of genetic information 
with respect to the employee . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (“No covered 
[employer] shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
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and Congress have recognized that discrimination can be more subtle—
resulting from selection criteria that unintentionally but significantly 
negatively impacts a protected class.  As a result of the Supreme Court’s 
holding that Title VII requires “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously 
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification,” 139  Congress amended Title VII to expressly proscribe 
unintentional (i.e., disparate impact) discrimination.
140
  The Supreme 
Court has also recognized that disparate impact claims apply under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act
141
 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act.
142
 
 
[39] While arguments have been made that big data is objective, raw 
data is immune to social bias, and mass-level analysis will avoid group-
based discrimination, big data is actually used to segregate individuals into 
groups.
143
  Using big data for employment-related selection criteria can 
                                               
employment.”).  All states have parallel laws that prohibit at least Title VII and disability, 
often with broader definitions of protected classes. 
 
139 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“The Act proscribes not only 
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation.”). 
 
140 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012)) (“An unlawful employment 
practice based on disparate impact is established . . . if—(i) a complaining party 
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a 
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the 
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity. . . .”).  
 
141 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)). 
 
142 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (plurality). 
 
143 See Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/09/think_again_big_data, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7GDR-EPZY; see generally Peter A. Chow-White & Sandy Green, Jr., 
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potentially “reproduce existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the 
prejudice of prior decision-makers, or simply reflect the widespread biases 
that persist in society.” 144   Data mining may reflect the quintessential 
unintentional discrimination, as the adverse selection criteria “may be an 
artifact of the data mining process itself, rather than a result of 
programmers assigning certain factors inappropriate weight.”145  Simply 
not having a LinkedIn profile or the ability to maintain a sophisticated 
electronic presence may disadvantage certain protected classes.
146
  
 
[40] While predictive analytics have been used to try to root out 
systemic discrimination,
147
 they may just as likely be perpetuating biases.  
Recall that the goal of some predictive analytics is to select candidates 
who will remain on the job longer.
148
  A recent PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
                                               
Data Mining Difference in the Age of Big Data: Communication and the Social Shaping 
of Genome Technologies from 1998 to 2007, 7 INT’L J. COMM. 556, 556 (2013) (asserting 
that the “seeming neutrality of data mining obfuscates domain assumptions and leaves 
cultural values and practices of power unexamined”). 
 
144 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV., 
at *3–4 (forthcoming 2016), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899, archived at 
http://perma.cc/559N-7TUR. 
 
145 Id. at *4. 
 
146
 See id. at *14–15 (noting big data analytics may negatively impact “historically 
disadvantaged groups at higher rates because they are less involved in the formal 
economy and its data-generating activities, [or] because they have unequal access to and 
relatively less fluency in the technology necessary to engage online”); Jonas Lerman, Big 
Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57 (2013), available at 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/66_stanlrevonline_55_
lerman.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R529-45D2 (noting the “the nonrandom, systemic 
omission of people who live on big data’s margins”); supra text accompanying notes 
111–112. 
 
147 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 124 (discussing Waber’s focus on workplace 
performance versus limited career growth for women). 
 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 117–118. 
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survey found that while external hires are increasing, more new hires are 
leaving within their first year.
149
  This is one factor that is driving the 
increasing use of predictive analytics in hiring.
150
  However, if historical 
data reflect that women leave their job after fewer years compared to men, 
women may be more likely to be selected out of a predictive optimization 
analysis.
151
  
 
[41] However, disparate impact discrimination claims are notoriously 
difficult to establish.  Under the disparate-impact statute,
152
 a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie violation by showing that an employer uses “a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”153   An employer may 
defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is “job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”154  
However, even if the employer meets that burden, a plaintiff may still 
succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an “available 
alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves 
the employer’s legitimate needs.”155  
                                               
149 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, STATE OF THE WORKFORCE: PWC SARATOGA’S 
2013/2014 U.S. HUMAN CAPITAL EFFECTIVENESS REPORT 10 (2013) [hereinafter STATE 
OF THE WORKFORCE], available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/hr-
management/publications/assets/pwc-saratoga-human-capital-effectiveness-report.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/N8VB-JTNS; see also Andrew R. McIlvaine, The Power 
(And Peril) of Predictive Analytics, HUMAN RES. EXEC. ONLINE (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story.jhtml?id=534357136, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8FQ5-XA4P. 
 
150 See STATE OF THE WORKFORCE, supra note 149, at 3. 
 
151 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 144, at *58.  
 
152 See supra note 140.  
 
153 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 
154 Id. 
 
155 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (k)(1)(C) (2012). 
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[42] Ironically, to prove a disparate impact case a plaintiff must make a 
threshold showing of a “significant statistical disparity;” thus “statistics 
are critical to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim . . . .”156  
Although big data and predictive analytics may be more concerned with 
correlation instead of causation,
157
 courts closely scrutinize statistical 
evidence in disparate impact cases and commonly dismiss them based on 
statistical error.
158
  Disparate impact cases are also relatively expensive, 
due not only to the need for statistical data and experts,
159
 but also because 
disparate impact is a class-based theory and class action lawsuits have 
their own significant up-front costs.
160
  Finally, disparate impact remedies 
are fairly limited—they include only substantive remedies, just as job 
reinstatement or promotion, not compensatory or punitive damages.
161
  
 
[43] Of course, employers will argue that their predictive analytics are 
directly tied to business needs such as productivity, retention, and 
promotion.  And some may argue their analytics actually correct 
discrimination by identifying situations in which members of a protected 
class are not being treated fairly.
162
  But with the practical hurdles to 
successfully pursue a disparate impact case, it is easy to conclude that data 
mining—and by implication predictive analytics—could potentially 
                                               
156 E. Ericka Kelsaw, Help Wanted: 23.5 Million Unemployed Americans Need Not 
Apply, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2013). 
 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 21–23. 
 
158 See Kelsaw, supra note 156, at 23, 28. 
 
159 See id. at 27–28. 
 
160 See id. at 28. 
 
161 See id. 
 
162 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 124 (discussing Waber’s focus on workplace 
performance versus limited career growth for women).  
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“exacerbate existing inequalities in difficult-to-counter ways.”163 
 
 C.  Limiting Predictive Analytics in the Workplace? 
[44] One could argue that screening job applicants or making other job-
related decisions based on a variety of outside inputs could fall within the 
purview of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),
164
 which very broadly 
defines a “consumer report” as:  
 
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any 
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a 
consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit 
capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected 
to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose 
of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s 
eligibility for— . . . (B) employment purposes . . . .165 
 
The FCRA defines “employment purposes” as “evaluating a consumer for 
employment, promotion, reassignment or retention as an employee.”166  
The FTC recently investigated the company Social Intelligence, a 
company that provides pre-employment background screening using 
information gleaned from the Internet and through social media, 
concluding the company was in compliance with the FCRA—implying 
that Social Intelligence’s services fell under the auspices of the FCRA.167  
                                               
163 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 144, at *59.  
 
164 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)). 
 
165 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2012). 
 
166 Id. § 1681a(h).  A “consumer” under the FCRA means an individual.  Id. § 1681a(c). 
 
167 See Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Associate Director, Federal Trade Commission 
Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, to Renee Jackson, Att’y for Social 
Intelligence (May 9, 2011), available at 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 4 
 
 42 
 
[45] The FCRA does not prevent employers from using background 
information to vet job applicants and employees;
168
 it merely requires 
certain disclosures
169
 and restricts a limited set of information that can be 
reported.
170
  The FCRA also only applies when an employer uses a 
“consumer reporting agency”171 to compile the consumer report; as such, 
it will not apply to larger employers—such as SAS or IBM—that perform 
their own internal job-related predictive analytics.
172
 
 
[46] The FCRA could provide a foundation for limiting the use of 
predictive analytics in the workplace.  The “mosaic” theory instructs us 
that using predictive analytics is not necessarily “fair game” just because 
the underlying data are derived from publicly available information or 
information in the hands of third parties.  A theoretical framework 
therefore exists to argue that predictive analytics using data mined from 
                                               
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/social-intelligence-
corporation/110509socialintelligenceletter.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8HD9-C3EM; 
see also Kashmir Hill, Social Media Background Check Company Ensures that Job-
Threatening Facebook Photos Are Part of Your Application, FORBES (June 20, 2011, 
12:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/06/20/now-your-
embarrassingjob-threatening-facebook-photos-will-haunt-you-for-seven-years/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/2F75-Q8MG. 
 
168 However, ten states do limit employers’ use of credit background checks.  See Use of 
Credit Information in Employment 2013 Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/use-of-
credit-info-in-employ-2013-legis.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/P5VW-FPZD (last 
updated Sept. 29, 2014). 
 
169 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681d, 1681m(a) (2012). 
 
170 See id. § 1681c (generally restricting information dating back more than seven or ten 
years). 
 
171 Id. § 1681a(f) (generally defining a consumer reporting agency as a person or entity 
that regularly compiles consumer reports for third parties for a fee). 
 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 118 & 121. 
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big data deserve some regulation.  At a minimum, notice should be 
provided to job applicants and employees if adverse decisions are based 
on analytics.
173
  More importantly, since predictive analytics rely more on 
behavioral and social data—unlike “traditional” consumer reports that are 
based on discrete fact-based transactions that can be challenged for 
accuracy—employers should have the burden to establish causation, not 
just correlation.  The mosaic theory can also add a layer of restriction by 
ensuring that big data profiles created for job applicants or employees do 
not extend beyond what society and individuals would reasonably expect; 
that they do not result in an intimate portrait greater than the sum of their 
parts.
174
  In short, every aspect of individuals’ digital lives should not be 
collected and analyzed by employers without restrictions on 
reasonableness and accuracy (of predictions, not of the underlying data). 
 
[47] Proponents of predictive analytics may argue that such restrictions 
could stifle progress and potentially prevent employers from using 
valuable tools that could boost productivity. However, cause and effect 
must be balanced.  Predictive analytics are unproven and subject to 
error.
175
  In the meantime, individuals’ livelihoods may be adversely 
affected.  Should we allow individuals to be denied a job, denied a 
promotion, or even fired, just because of a random correlation based on 
behavioral information employees had no idea their employers had access 
to? 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[48] Workforce predictive analytics go beyond mere workplace 
monitoring.  Employers are not just monitoring call length, how many 
boxes a worker can pack in an hour, or whether a worker is “cyberloafing” 
by watching cat videos instead of processing invoices.  By analyzing 
                                               
173 Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 1681m (2012). 
 
174 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 20–22, 24. 
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social media communications, personal interaction data, even with whom 
one eats lunch, employers are attempting to build profiles going well 
beyond the mechanics of work and that can potentially reveal more about 
a worker than he or she knows about him or herself.  The same concerns 
raised by proponents of the mosaic theory and critiques of data 
agglomeration apply equally—if not more176—to workplace analytics. 
 
[49] The threat to worker privacy is real, so tradeoffs will have to be 
considered, beginning with data collection standards.  Unfortunately, most 
calls for standards relate to general Internet tracking, are fairly 
amorphous,
177
 and are not workplace-specific.  The World Economic 
Forum has at least made one fairly concrete suggestion, though still related 
to commercial tracking: govern the usage of data rather than the data 
themselves.
178
  Meanwhile, Ian Kerr and Jessica Earle conclude that “[b]ig 
data enables a universalizable strategy of preemptive social decision-
                                               
176 See generally Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee 
Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 980 (2011) (arguing that U.S. employees have minimal 
workplace privacy protections principally because employers can defeat any expectation 
of privacy by notifying employees that intrusive monitoring is taking place).  Cf. City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (“[E]mployer policies concerning [cell phone 
and text message] communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of 
their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.”). 
 
177
 See, e.g., BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 2, at 59 (recommending, in 
part, maintaining privacy values); WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA: THE 
EMERGENCE OF A NEW ASSET CLASS 32–35 (2011), available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8LL5-9GXU (recommending world leaders should take steps 
to: “[i]nnovate around user-centricity and trust”; “[d]efine global principles for using and 
sharing personal data”; “[s]trengthen the dialog between regulators and the private 
sector”; “[f]ocus on interoperability and open standards”; and “[c]ontinually share 
knowledge”). 
 
178 See World Econ. Forum, Unlocking the Value of Personal Data: From Collection to 
Usage 4 (2013), available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IT_UnlockingValuePersonalData_CollectionUsag
e_Report_2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/74VK-9AGZ. 
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making [that] renders individuals unable to observe, understand, 
participate in, or respond to information gathered or assumptions made 
about them;” in other words, “big data can be used to make important 
decisions that implicate us without our even knowing it.”179  As such, they 
argue for a reexamination of privacy and due process values—“namely, 
that there is wisdom in setting boundaries around the kinds of assumptions 
that can and cannot be made about people.”180  This supports this article’s 
earlier call for disclosure whenever predictive analytics are used in an 
adverse employment decision and placing the burden on the employer to 
show causation, not just correlation in the analytics’ conclusions. 
 
[50] But perhaps workplace analytics will suffer the same fate as 
Taylorism before privacy, anti-discrimination law, or other regulations can 
catch up.  In 1910 a group of molders walked off the job at Watertown 
Arsenal because they refused to be monitored by a supervisor with a 
stopwatch.
181
  The strike led to a five month Congressional hearing to 
“investigate the Taylor and other systems of shop management.”182  The 
Committee’s report concluded that “[n]either the Taylor system nor any 
other should be imposed from above on an unwilling work force.”183  “A 
fair day’s work can’t be fixed by a stopwatch, which could ‘determine the 
time in which a piece of work can be done, but [not] . . . the length of time 
in which it ought to be done.’”184  
 
[51] Until the courts begin to recognize the threats to privacy by 
                                               
179 Kerr & Earle, supra note 9, at 71. 
 
180 Id. at 66. 
 
181 See generally KANIGEL, supra note 104, at 451–54 (describing the events leading to 
the molders’ strike). 
 
182 Id. at 459. 
 
183 Id. at 482 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
184 Id. at 482–83 (alteration in original).  
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ubiquitous tracking—preferably through a mosaic theory applied not only 
to private trackers but also particularly to employers—everyone faces the 
risk of anonymous third parties knowing the intimate details of their 
private lives.  Until then, in the non-workforce environment, we have 
almost no choice but to succumb to the tracking.
185
  Within the workforce, 
though, today’s workers are left with a Hobson’s choice of giving up their 
privacy or giving up their job,
186
 if the predictive analytics even allow 
them to have the job.
187
  
 
 
                                               
185 See generally Goldstein, supra note 46 (stating “hiding from big data is inconvenient 
and expensive”); supra text accompanying note 101.  
 
186 Cf. Bauerlein & Jeffery, supra note 106, at 20, 23 (noting that modern workers must 
comply with increased demands at work or risk losing their jobs). 
 
187 Frank Pasquale urges us “to face the darker possibilities betokened by current trends.”  
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 16–17 (2015) (“We have come to rely on 
the titans of reputation, search, and finance to help us make sense of the world; it is time 
for policymakers to help us make sense of the sensemakers.”). 
